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Abstract 
 
This article discusses how a group of four-year-old children in New Zealand engage in pretend 
play by embodying the characters of mud-monsters and possums to avoid the rules around 
being respectful to their cultural heritage whilst playing in a protected bush reserve. The data 
were generated through a project investigating teaching and learning in everyday conversations 
between preschool teachers and children aged 2 ½ - 5 years old. Ten hours of video footage 
were gathered, or which one hour and forty minutes were in rural bushland.  
 
The concept of ‘play’ is notoriously ambiguous (Sutton-Smith, 1997), but we do know that 
when children engage in make-believe play the activity provides benefits for psychological 
development and holistic health (Kitson, 2010), and building knowledge and relationships 
(Bateman, 2015). Prior research on children’s pretend play using conversation analysis and 
membership categorisation analysis reveal how membership categories are used to initiate and 
maintain social order during pretend play (Butler, 2008; Butler & Weatherall, 2006), and how 
object transformation is locally managed by children either as an individual or collaborative 
project (Sidnell, 2011). 
 
The analysis of the footage here uses an ethnomethodological framework, discussing the work 
of Sacks (1992) and Garfinkel (1967) to reveal the sequential organisation of moral conduct in 
situ. The unfolding interaction begins with the children entering a protected bush reserve where 
they are encouraged to perform the act of making a promise to the Māori God of the forest, 
Tāne Mahuta, to protect his trees and plants during their visit. The teachers subsequently orient 
back to this performative action when the children’s play later becomes destructive. The 
multimodal ways of embodying their chosen destructive characters through predicated actions 
reveal how the children attempt to evade the negative consequences of breaking their promise 
through pretend play, as they become the characters ‘mud-monsters’ and ‘possums’ who are 
no longer the children tied to the performative action. The article concludes with connections 
to moral philosophy, and by discussing how the turns of talk and gesture co-produce complex 
learning of culturally and morally appropriate behaviours in situ.  
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This article is developed from prior work exploring how the outdoor environment provides 
opportunities for children to learn about being respectful of indigenous Māori protocols during 
outdoor activity in a protected bush reserve in New Zealand (Bateman, Hohepa and Bennett, 
2017). The issues specifically around children’s morality are now explored in more detail with 
reference to moral philosophy to explore further how moral stance is executed by the children 
and teacher in the co-production of everyday interaction on a turn-by-turn basis.   
 
Children, rules and accountability    
 
Accountability and rules are embedded in everyday life where they build the foundation for 
cultural norms and what is defined as acceptable or unacceptable behaviour. Children’s social 
interactions demonstrate their competence in rule governance and the co-production of their 
own unique culture (for example, Corsaro & Eder, 1990). From an ethnomethodological 
perspective, Sacks (1992, Volume 2) suggests that children learn about rules ‘when a rule is 
used to correct some action that they did or didn’t do’ (p. 491), making a specific rule applicable 
to their action and directly relevant for them. Although, in order to stay out of trouble, children 
just need to conform to rules, in reality rules are very narrow in their correct use, so where 
applying a rule in one situation might be correct, it is incorrect if applied to a different situation. 
These experiences teach children that rules are applicable everywhere, and that it is just a 
matter of finding the right rule for the right situation in order to avoid getting into trouble, and 
this problem is one that is usually managed ‘empirically’.  
 
So, as adults characteristically use a rule to correct a child's intendedly rule-
governed activity, one thing that can and does occur is the child using a rule 
to counterpose a proposed violation. Children come to learn to answer 
complaints about possible rule violations by introducing another rule which 
yields the very thing that is being treated as a violation. And they get a special 
kick out of it. So they can be motivated to acquire skill in rule manipulation 
by reference to the way that that can save them in situations of possible 
sanction…. This is one perfect fantasy solution for children who live with the 
authority of adults. 
(Sacks, 1992, Vol II, p. 492). 
 
From an ethnomethodological perspective, rules are tied to accountability and social sanctions 
in everyday life where the accountability of actions is a contextual matter (Garfinkel, 1967). 
Accountable actions are similar to laws, in that they are often there to guide particular 
behaviour but can be “loose” and conditional on the context. As Helmer and Rescher (1958, 
cited in Garfinkle, 1967) suggest, ‘a supposed violation of the law may be explicable by 
showing that a legitimate, but as yet unformulated, precondition of the law’s applicability is 
not fulfilled in the case under consideration’ (p. 2). Norms and remedial interchanges are 
employed that provide ‘penalties for infraction…[and]…rewards for exemplary compliance. 
The significance of these rewards and penalties is not meant to lie in their intrinsic, substantive 
worth but in what they proclaim about the moral status of the actor’ (Goffman, 1971, p. 95). 
Demonstrating an inclination to abide by rules, or not, gives others the opportunity to judge the 
moral character of that person.    
 
In the study now discussed, the practical procedures of observable moral work is explored, 
include making a promise to a Māori God before entering His forest, where this action is treated 
as an accountable everyday mundane activity that is recognisable as familiar for those members 
of that particular New Zealand early childhood centre. 
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The project 
 
Teachers in New Zealand (and in many other countries currently) are encouraged to support 
and extend the learning of infants, toddlers and young children through following their interests 
where ‘[t]ime and opportunities are provided for children to talk about moral issues’ (Ministry 
of Education [MoE], 1996, p. 71). Such guidance within national curricula recognises not only 
the importance of affording opportunities for children to form and express their moral stance, 
but also the collaborative nature, or co-construction of moral work where morality is viewed 
as being accomplished and shaped in interaction with others. 
The importance of outdoor play is also recognised in the New Zealand early childhood national 
curriculum, Te Whāriki (MoE, 1996), to encourage children to engage with their natural 
surroundings where opportunities for exploration of the natural world are afforded.   
The current project explored teacher-child interactions in everyday early childhood education 
with one centre in New Zealand (Bateman, 2012). The research approach was theoretically 
framed by ethnomethodology to explore everyday practice in situ. Everyday interactions 
between teachers and children aged 2 ½ years – 5 years were video recorded intermittently 
throughout one year, where one hour and forty minutes of video recording were taken on a 
routine outing to a protected bush reserve. Ethical approval was gained through the Waikato 
University Ethics Committee, including assent processes for children, and processes for 
withdrawing assent. At the end of the video collection day, the participating teachers identified 
moments of significant teaching and learning. These moments were then transcribed and 
analysed using a conversation analysis approach (Sacks, 1992) to reveal the systematic orderly 
features of the co-construction of knowledge. This article now focuses on the single case 
analysis of the bush walk and discusses the work of Sacks (1992), Garfinkel (1967) and moral 
philosophy to reveal how the children and teachers accomplish moral work as a joint project 
through attending to the rule of making a promise to the Māori God, Tāne Mahuta upon 
entering the forest. During analysis of the data, the teachers and children were observed 
orienting to the making of a promise, and this action was oriented back to throughout the trip, 
making this a phenomenon of interest for the participants themselves, and so one of the 
inductive findings. The time of each transcript is presented to show how this is managed in real 
time.  
 
Children’s morality in action  
 
Excerpt 1 
 
Each time the children are on a bush walk they are required to perform the routine of asking 
Tāne Mahuta, the  Māori God of the forest, permission to enter by reciting specific words that 
make a promise to Him not to hurt his animals, trees or plants. The following transcript presents 
how this promise is made in situ by two children and with prompts from a teacher. This first 
interaction is between the early childhood teacher Tim (TIM), Kyber (KBR) and Dyaln (DYL) 
who are four-year-old children; they are also accompanied by a second teacher (TCH). A young 
girl, Hera, who is new to the preschool is also present.   
 
Tim 2nd data collection: Time: 32 seconds 
 
01 TIM: [poor tree] 
02 KBR: [Tāne Mahuta] can we come in (0.4) we won’t hurt  
 4 
03  your >animals< or your (0.4) creatures or you pl::ants 
04  (0.8) I said the wo:rds: 
05 TCH: I=was=just need to explain to Hera (1.5) when we were 
06  on the bridge- before we go into Pukemokemoke we ask  
07  [(    )] 
08 ?:  [Pukemokemoke] 
09 TCH: Pukemokemoke: we ask Tāne Mahuta who’s the God 
10  of the forest (0.6) permission to enter his forest  
11  Dylan do you want to tell (0.7) Hera what we sa:y 
12 DYL: y’ave to sa:y (0.6) >Tāne=Mahuta< please can we come in 
13  º>an=we=wont=hurt=any=of=your=animals<º 
 
As the children approach the forest, Tim’s ‘poor tree’ (line 01) marks an empathic approach to 
treating the natural environment in a sensitive way from the start of the excursion. This 
empathic approach towards the environment, initiated by an adult co-produces socialisation of 
how to act and engage with specific environments in moral ways (Burdelski, 2013). Kyber 
overlaps this utterance and delves right in to reciting a well-rehearsed promise to Tāne Mahuta 
(lines 2 & 3). The action of making this promise marks a particular position through a 
performative action (Sacks, 1992), where he commits to acting in a particular way through 
saying particular words (Austin, 1961; 1962). His closing utterance ‘I said the words’ (line 4) 
displays his knowledge that this performative action is a social norm that is done prior to 
entering the forest. This action of saying the promise binds the children to act in a morally just, 
respectful way where subsequent actions are limited to those stated in the promise.  
 
Although Kyber immediately recites the promise here, other children present have not, and so 
the teacher draws their attentions to the act of making the promise as a collective group (lines 
05-10). In doing so, the teacher creates a collective moral stance towards behaving in this 
specific way in the protected bush reserve, making it the social norm in that place and at that 
time. Through joining together to assert this moral rule the children and teachers are enacting 
a collaborative affiliation to each other and Tāne Mahuta.  
 
Excerpt 2 
 
A problem then occurs a little less than a minute later when, at the entrance of the forest, one 
of the four-year-old children, Kaiden (KDN), refuses to conform to the rule of making the 
promise. Tim is seen to attend to this issue by scaffolding the child into saying the promise 
with him as a collaborative act.   
 
Tim 2nd data collection: Time: 1 min 20 seconds 
 
14 TIM: did you ask (0.5) Kaiden ((walks towards Kaiden)) 
15 KDN: <ºI don’t want toº> ((faces the bridge, looking away from 
16  Tim)) 
17 TIM: you don’t want to  
18 KDN: ºnoº 
19 TIM: we need to make sure that (0.4) he knows that we’re not 
20  going to hurt his trees ((crouches down to Kaiden)) 
21  (0.8) 
22 KDN: ºnoº 
23  (0.9) 
24 TIM: hmmm  
25 KDN: º<no::>º 
26 TIM: we can say it together 
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27 KDN: º<no::>º 
28 TIM: why not  
29 KDN: coz I don’t want to:= 
30 TIM:       =did you wake up grumpy  
31  (2.3) 
32 KDN: ºI want to (1.3) (be) at <m:um:s>º 
33 TIM: pardon 
34 KDN: I=want to be at mums 
35 TIM: oh (0.7) we’ll say it quickly (7.0) me and you (1.0) 
36   Tāne Mahuta (1.1) can we come in to your forest [we] 
37 KDN:              [º(  )º]  
38 TIM: wont hurt any of your tree::s  
39 KDN: or your <creatures> 
40 TIM: or your <creatures> . that’s good . right . come on 
41  do you wanna hold my hand ((Kaiden and Tim hold hands 
42  and walk into the forest together with Matthew)) 
 
Sacks’ (1992) discussion on children and rules suggests that children learn about rules in 
everyday life, through taking part in and observing activities, and by doing or not doing 
something in a correct way. Here, we see Kaiden not performing to the rules tied to the routine 
of entering the forest, as he refuses to recite the words that would lock him into a promise, 
limiting his subsequent actions to those cited in his promise.   
 
The refusal begins with Kaiden’s drawn out, but quiet presentation of this stance (lines 15-16) 
where he also marks his disaffiliation from the ongoing activity with gesture as he turns away 
and averts his gaze from Tim. Tim begins persuasion techniques specifically designed for 
Kaiden through his addressing of Kaiden’s name (line 14) and through aligning his bodily 
position by crouching down to him (line 20). Tim offers a collaborative saying of the words, 
uniting them both as being tied to the promise together, and so taking a collaborative moral 
stance towards acting in a specific way. This initially does not work, as Kaiden offers an 
alternative activity to the one he is required to do by saying he wants to be at his Mum’s (line 
32).  Tim, however, continues with his persuasion offering to say the words ‘quickly’ and 
together ‘me and you’ eventually prompting Kaiden to join in making the promise and moral 
obligation to Tāne Mahuta. By joining together in making the promise Tim and Kaiden are 
demonstrating their affiliation in acting in a specific moral way together.  
 
Excerpt 3 
 
Much later on the bush walk, the children and teachers have reached a clearing that they have 
called ‘the playground’ due to its topography which includes low branches to swing on, open 
space to run in and ditches to climb. As the children explore the area, Kyber (KBR) begins 
enacting the character of a possum.   
 
Tim 2nd data collection: Time: 1 hour 18 mins 45 seconds 
 
43 KBR: I’m a possum  
44 JKS: well I’m not going that far ((points to the stream))     
45 KBR: ((grabs leaves and throws them into the stream)) 
46 TIM: hey Kyber (0.6) [we promised] 
47 KBR:       [I’m not Kyber] 
48  (3.1) 
49 TIM: well you promised Tāne Mahuta you weren’t going to 
50  hurt (0.5) >his=things< and throwing- (0.8) throwing 
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51  bra:nches is not (0.6) being respectful 
52 JKS: well I’m not gonna throw them ei:ther  
53 TIM: that’s good 
54 JKS: >because< I’m not gonna break <m:y:> promise 
55 TIM: .hhh I know you’re being a possum (0.3) and that is 
56  the sort of thing that possums do (1.2) but um 
57  (1.0) you did promise [Tāne that you wouldn’t hurt 
58  it] 
59 JKS:        [look he’s b- he broke it] 
60   ((Kyber picks a branch off the ground and breaks it 
61  in half. Kyber looks at Tim and taps the two branch 
62  pieces together)) 
63 TIM: oh that’s a (0.3) dead branch on the ground that’s 
64  ok 1.9) but throwing it [at]- 
65 JKS:      [not] that tree ((points)) 
66 TIM: throwing it at plants is not being respectful=do you want 
67  to come- 
68 KBR: ((hits a bush with one of the branch halves)) 
69  (2.4) 
70 JKS: he did that 
71 TIM: >Kyber<  
72 KBR: ((turns to make eye contact with Tim)) 
73  (2.1) 
74 TIM: please stop being so destructive 
75  (2.0) 
76 KBR: ((looks down and starts walking away)) 
77 JKS: I’m not gonna do that  
78 TIM: lets [go] and find something to do instead 
79  ((they move away from the site)) 
 
Kyber initiates this interaction with Tim and Jackson by approaching them and announcing his 
new persona, prior to the gesture of throwing leaves and sticks into a nearby stream. The verbal 
action here mitigates Kyber’s subsequent physical actions, where he shows an awareness that 
he is acting in a way that needs this pre-mitigating utterance ‘I’m a possum’ in the sequence of 
the interaction as he engages in an activity that is in conflict to his earlier promise. The way in 
which the interaction unfolds then confirms that Kyber’s mitigation was needed, as Tim 
subsequently refers back to the promise and how this ties him to behave in a specific way.  
 
The way in which Tim addresses this inappropriate behaviour (lines 49-51 & 55-58) is indirect 
and more of a warning then an explicit request to stop, where ‘that you ought not to do the 
thing – is itself not asserted’ (Sacks, 1992, p. 193). Tim ‘isn’t saying that you ought not to do 
it because it is wrong’ (ibid), rather, the technique that Tim uses here is an offer of ‘good 
advice’ not a telling off. This conversational technique allows Tim to reprimand in a safe way 
without coming across as ‘a traitor among them, or perfectly clearly an adult in child’s guise’ 
(Ibid). In doing so Tim removes himself from any consequential reprimand for Kyber’s 
behaviour, and instead asserts an observational fact that asserts empathy for the environment, 
and so suggests a moral perspective about the behaviour whilst still maintaining his affiliation 
with Kyber. Kyber’s actions here do not conform to Māori protocol that calls for the protection 
of the natural bush land, and instead actively show his breaking of his earlier promise (made 
in Excerpt 1) and immoral behaviour, and a ‘danger’ for Tim as a teacher whose role it is to 
ensure such Māori protocols are practiced during outdoor excursions.  
 
Warnings, however, can in fact be heard as a challenge to those being warned, where, if a 
warning is successful it brings the warned person to recognise their actions as being in the class 
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‘dangerous’ (Sacks, 1992, Vol 1). The warned person may then see this as a challenge to 
continue their actions in order to belong to the category ‘dangerous’. 
 
Here, Kyber asserts himself as no longer being Kyber (line 47), the boy who is tied to making 
the promise upon entering the forest, but a possum (line 43) - two separate beings. Kyber and 
the possum character, as Sacks states above, are ‘no longer subjectable to the same warnings’ 
where the actions of each asserted character can be differentiated as ‘things that are dangerous 
for one, are not for the other’, (Sacks, 1992, p. 347). Whereas Kyber made a promise to behave 
in a certain moral way when entering the forest, the possum character (known throughout NZ 
as being destructive to native bushland) did not, and so any sanctions are no longer applicable.  
 
 If, for example, there is something which, if you want to be a man you have to 
do, or if you have doubts about whether you are a man you might do to show it, 
then…[a man] refuses the warning, accepts the challenge, becomes a different 
object: No longer a boy, a man. As such, no longer subjectable to the same 
warnings. And that's of course a fact about dangerous things; they are 
differentiated. Things that are dangerous for one, are not for the other. 
(Sacks, 1992, Vol 1, p. 347). 
 
Helmer and Rescher’s (1958 cited in Garfinkel, 1967) discussion of accountable actions and 
laws is applicable here when considering how they are “loose” and conditional on the context, 
where what is applicable in one situation is not in another. As is Sacks’ (1992, Vol 2) discussion 
on children’s use of rules where they learn that rules are also “loose” and context specific. Here, 
Kyber transforms himself from the person who would ordinarily be accountable for acting in a 
destructive way in a bush reserve, to a creature that is recognisable (even by the teacher) as 
being destructive to native bushland. This chosen character allows Kyber to display category 
bound activities that are relevant to such a character, and so permits him to act ‘without 
important moral consequences’ (ibid, p. 206).  
 
Within this interaction, Jackson, a four-year-old girl also demonstrates her moral stance and  
understanding of the moral issues at play as she announces her opposing actions (lines 44 & 
52 & 77) and that she will not brake her promise (line 55). By drawing attention to Kyber’s 
actions she is also pointing out her own moral stance as being in opposition to Kyber.  
 
Excerpt 4 
 
Tim 2nd data collection: Time: 1 hour 25 mins 10 seconds 
 
A few minutes later, Tim and Jackson are sitting on a tree at the playground site. Kyber 
approaches them and asks Tim if he will be involved in a game of mud-monsters, swinging on 
the tree that Tim and Jackson are sitting on.  
 
 
80 JKS: <sto:::p> ((looks at Kyber)) 
81 TIM: >Kyber< (0.7) are [you listening] 
82 KBR:      [I’m not Kyber] I’m not Kyber 
83 TIM: you’re the mud monster 
84 KBR: yeah 
85 TIM: Jackson is asking you to stop  
86  (2.4) 
87 KBR: ((looks at Tim and pulls some bark off the tree)) 
88 TIM: please stop pulling the trees apart Kyber (1.1) you 
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89  promised Tāne Mahuta that you wouldn’t hurt his trees 
90  and you have been- (0.5) been very destructive since we 
91  got to the playground 
92 KBR: ((stops pulling the bark and looks down then walks 
93  away towards a group of children)) 
 
 
Kyber approaches Tim and Jackson, and this time begins swinging on the tree that Tim and 
Jackson are sitting in. This embodied way of initiating an interaction with Tim and Jackson 
does elicit a sequential response from the people he has approached, where Tim calls Kyber’s 
name in a short but loud prosody. Following a brief pause, Kyber and Tim overlap as Tim tries 
to ensure that Kyber is listening (line 81), and Kyber asserts that, once again, he is not Kyber 
(line 82), repeating this after the overlap to ensure he is heard, in overlap resolution. Tim 
identifies the new persona ‘mud-monster’, demonstrating understanding around Kyber’s new 
identity.  
 
Whilst it is true that Kyber’s actions breach Māori protocol here (and this might be a good 
reason to promise not to act in this way) it is the breaking of an earlier promise that is relied 
upon to persuade Kyber to change behaviour. Thus Kyber’s supposed moral obligations are 
taken by all participants to arise not from the existence of external rules that must be 
recognised. Instead, the moral obligations are taken to apply in light of Kyber’s voluntary 
promise which creates these obligations for him and set standards to which he can now 
legitimately be held (lines 88-91). 
 
Promising and Agency 
 
So, from an ethnomethodological perspective, what we see in these conversational interactions 
are a clear set of statements that invoke the idea of moral rules and moral practices in situ. 
These include both pre-existing rules that are taken to have an imperative moral character and 
promises that either create rules or bind promise-makers to those existing rules. Sacks (1992) 
points out that moral statements of this sort are effectively assertions of affiliation, or perhaps 
expressions of solidarity, with a group. However, it is worth taking seriously the question that 
he says has typically concerned philosophers, ‘if you assert some moral rule, are you doing 
anything more than asserting your affiliation?’ (Sacks, Vol 1, 1992, p.195). It is certainly true 
that when you assert a rule for any reason then you are also asserting an affiliation (even if just 
to the group of people who together assert this rule) but is this all that you are doing? To some 
extent this remains an open question but further analysis of the interactions in the excerpts will 
make it clear that those involved in those interactions assume that they are not necessarily 
limited to expressing an affiliation. Nor is it clear that this is merely an interesting sociological 
or psychological feature of the people involved in these conversations rather than being, at the 
same time, a practical, if implicit, engagement with positions and disputes in moral philosophy. 
 
It is interesting then to also consider moral and political philosophy here, to provide additional 
insight into issues of morality that complement the ethnomethodological approach used in this 
article. Morality and contract-based approaches are long standing, from the classic social 
contract theories of Hobbes (1996), Locke (1988) and Rousseau (1968) to contemporary 
theories of Gauthier (1986), Rawls (1999) and Scanlon (1998). These approaches, whilst 
varied, share the broad understanding of moral obligations as created or legitimated by the 
agreements people make to regulate our social and political interactions. In very basic terms, 
we are obliged to constrain our behaviour because we have agreed, one way or another, to do 
so. Contemporary contract-based approaches are typically divided into contractarian (or 
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Hobbesian) approaches and contractualist (or Kantian) approaches (Darwall, 2003; Freeman, 
2007; Kymlicka, 1991; Sayre-McCord, 2000). Contractarian approaches (e.g. Hobbes and 
Gauthier) tend to think of contracts as rational agreements to cooperate made between self-
interested persons as bargains for their mutual advantage. Contractualist approaches (e.g. 
Scanlon and Rawls) tend to think of contracts as reasonable agreements to cooperate made on 
the basis of respect for the freedom and moral equality of persons.  
 
The interactions in situ make it clear that Tim, Kaiden and Kyber (and others present), despite 
the difficulties that are experienced, share a conception of the source of moral obligations and 
of the legitimacy of moral rules, as they demonstrate their ‘engagement with culture-building 
webs of meaning and repertoires of social practice’ (Ochs & Schieffelin 2012, p. 17). They are 
working with an understanding that obligations to limit or constrain behaviour are created and 
self-imposed by the act of promising rather than imposed on us by the assertion of authority or 
assumed by us as a function of group membership or shared affiliation. This is implicit in the 
reasons that are offered by Tim, to Kaiden and Kyber, for limiting their actions and changing 
their behaviour. It would be easy for Tim to assert the authority that comes with the role of 
teacher, effectively saying “obey the rule because I have the legitimate authority to impose it”, 
but Tim does not. He presents himself as a co-participant in the act of promising, rather than 
the source of obligation. Nor does Tim suggest to the children that the divine authority of Tāne 
Mahuta is the source of the obligation to constrain behaviour. Yes, promising is framed as part 
of asking Tāne Mahuta for permission to enter his forest but this ownership and the authority 
it provides is not presented as the source of the obligation to behave respectfully. Rather, it is 
presented to the children in a way that prompts them to have autonomy in assuming for 
themselves this obligation. Nor is the argument made to Kaiden or Kyber that they are already 
members of their group and that this community membership brings with it already assumed, 
or involuntary, obligations that have authority for them (Walzer, 2004). Instead, the children 
are treated as ‘competent and confident learners and communicators’ (MoE,1996, p.9) where 
‘[t]ime and opportunities are provided for children to talk about moral issues’ (Ibid, p. 71). In 
this way we should think of children’s socialisation around morality not simply as a matter of 
coming to act in accordance with group rules or standards for behaviour but as a more 
reciprocal process in which the children are regarded, and regard themselves, as active 
participants in that process (Burdelski, 2013; 2017). 
 
It is worth exploring moral philosophy further here to see what these interactions imply about 
the moral understandings that appear to be shared by all participants. For example, one 
prominent account of how promising might be linked to obligation, a utilitarian 
consequentialist account, does not seem to be called upon by participants at all. Classic 
statements of utilitarianism can be found in Bentham (2001) and Mill (1962). Broadly speaking 
utilitarians typically argue that promises should be kept and moral rules followed because a 
failure to do so would lead, either directly as a consequence of punishment (for example) or 
indirectly as a consequence of the undermining of the useful institution of promising, to 
diminished welfare. On this understanding, persons are primarily seen as sites of welfare, or 
utility. For example, in Bentham’s interpretation persons are seen as experiencers of pleasure 
and pain and all justifying reasons are assessed in terms of their consequences for overall utility 
comprising of the maximisation of pleasure and the minimisation of pain (Bentham, 2001, pp. 
87-93). At no point in these, admittedly limited, interactions are justifying reasons for moral 
obligations offered to the children in these terms. Nor are they rejected by the children on these 
grounds. Indeed, both the reasons that are offered in justification of obligations and the grounds 
on which Kyber challenges his perceived obligation reflect a very different shared 
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understanding of the relationship between promising and obligation, one linked to the idea of 
contract. 
 
However, the reasons offered in the recorded interactions for making and keeping promises are 
not easily characterised in contractarian terms. They are not rational advantage arguments 
appealing to instrumental reasons such as “you will benefit” or “you will be safer”. Instead 
they are more easily characterised as broadly contractualist arguments about the reasonableness 
of agreeing to rules that respect the moral standing of others, whether they be fellow 
participants in these forest activities or the Māori communities whose beliefs they are 
promising to respect. However, contract-based approaches, whether contractarian or 
contractualist, share a deeper theoretical commitment that is more fundamental in the analysis 
of these interactions, the conception of persons as agents in their own right and with their own 
standing. It is this conception of persons as agents that is most apparent in each of the excerpts, 
making observable the implementation of Te Whāriki (MoE, 1996) where children are 
philosophically presented as capable and competent members of society.  
 
Persons as agents are capable of taking decisions and making agreements such as promises or 
contracts that bind them. ‘Obligations…arise as a result of our voluntary acts’ and ‘thus 
promising is an act done with the public intention of deliberately incurring an obligation’ 
(Rawls, 1999, pp. 97 & 305). There are commonly accepted conditions for the making of 
binding and legitimate promises. Rawls argues that, 
 
For example, in order to make a binding promise, one must be fully 
conscious, in a rational frame of mind, and know the meaning of the 
operative words…. Furthermore, these words must be spoken freely or 
voluntarily, when one is not subject to threats or coercion… or forced to 
promise, or if pertinent information was deceitfully withheld. 
(Rawls, 1999, p. 303) 
 
Scanlon (1998, p. 199) accepts similar conditions for binding promises. What unites this list of 
conditions is that they each highlight ways in which a person’s agency may be impaired and 
thus the ‘bindingness’ of the promise undermine. Binding promises are made by persons whose 
agency is not so compromised.  
 
It is this conception of persons as agents capable of binding themselves with promises that we 
find in contract theories, and also language socialisation theory (Ochs & Schieffelin, 2012). 
Persons, including children, are regarded as beings with the agency that enables them to engage 
successfully with promising and the moral rules that they thus create. In response to the open 
question above, these children are not just affiliating to a group of one sort or another but also 
exercising their moral agency, as it recommended in Te Whāriki (MoE, 1996;2017). Their 
moral character is exhibited not just in rule-following behaviour but also in rule creation, and 
this is as apparent to the children as to their teacher. All parties, at least implicitly, recognise 
the relatively sophisticated capacity for moral agency in these children and, by extension, in 
children generally. This is apparent in several central aspects of the interactions highlighted in 
excerpts 1-4. Firstly, Tim actively seeks the promise of the children implicitly recognising their 
agency. Likewise, the children respond as agents. Secondly, the children are clearly capable of 
recognising, understanding and utilising the concept of moral rules and obligations created by 
binding promises. Thirdly, Kyber’s strategy of role-playing an alternative agent such as the 
possum (excerpt 3) and the mud monster (excerpt 4) displays a sophisticated conception of 
agency, demonstrating that they are not passive recipients of adult rules here (Ochs & 
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Schieffelin, 2012). Tim responds to Kyber as an agent who makes the distinction between his 
binding promise to Tāne Mahuta as Kyber, and the possum and the mud monster who have not 
so bound themselves. Kyber is exploiting an implicit understanding of the revolutionary 
potential of contract theories, and also shows his agency in contributing to the moral order 
(Ochs & Schieffelin, 2012). Finally, implicit is a recognition by all that children, like adults, 
are agents which can be held to agreed standards of constrained behaviour in a way that neither 
animals nor monsters can be. 
  
Concluding remarks  
 
Although the benefits of play for children’s learning are well-documented (for example, 
Pramling-Samuelsson & Fleer, 2009; Waller. Et al., 2017), children’s competences in 
confronting adult-centric culturally and morally appropriate behaviours through play is less 
well-known, and explored here. We suggest that analysis demonstrates that children can exhibit 
a grasp of relatively complex moral concepts and behaviours that may track more sophisticated 
ideas from moral philosophy. Here we see that the children displayed agency in their playful 
activity, where pretend play offered affordances to re-formulating adult rules.  
 
The collaborative nature of morality is evident here as being co-constructed in interaction and 
as a joint effort to be interactionally achieved. Kyber tries on the mud-monster and possum 
personas by announcing them to Tim to ensure the required understanding is secured to 
mitigate any subsequent disciplinary actions from Tim around his morally inappropriate 
behaviour in a sacred space.  
 
What these interactions illustrate is that children, no less than adults, are being regarded by all 
participants as not simply the recipients of authoritative rules from an external source, nor 
simply as sites for the experience of welfare, but as sophisticated co-creators of the moral rules 
that apply to them as agents (Ochs & Schieffelin, 2012). This should not really be a surprise as 
questions of moral rules and legitimate and reasonable constraints on behaviour arise out of 
the challenges of living together in societies and these challenges are faced by all persons, 
whatever their age. As Sacks (1992) suggests, children learn about how to negotiate such rules 
through their active participation in everyday life with others. Here we see that the children are 
engaged in making promises ‘to set up and to stabilize small-scale schemes of cooperation’ 
(Rawls, 1999, p. 304). They equally, therefore, face the challenge of justifying their actions to 
themselves and to those with whom they share a social context. Again, children are regarding 
themselves (and here also being so regarded by their teacher) as beings whose agency means 
they are expected to provide justifications of their actions and also that they are owed 
justifications of the actions of others and of the expectations of them that others have. 
 
Implications, practice or policy 
 
The exploration of the interactions in this article inductively revealed the sequential 
organisation of moral work between teachers and children in situ. We argue here that pretend 
play affords opportunities for children to engage in such important moral work, and hope to 
raise awareness of ensuring that early childhood teachers find space to support children to 
exercise their agency by participating in the co-creation of rules that apply to them. Through 
raising awareness, we hope to reinforce the importance of i) the recognition of the agency of 
others, ii) how children are socialised morally and empathically, and iii) building practices and 
habits of reciprocity and mutual recognition in everyday practice. 
 
 12 
However, the issues explored here also raise conflicting issues for teachers who, in New 
Zealand (and increasingly other countries) aim to support and extend children’s learning 
through playful activity initiated by the child’s interests. What occurs here suggests that 
conforming to important protocols supporting cultural heritage and conventions is a complex 
issue with young children and worthy of further exploration in future research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Austin, J. L. 1961: Performative utterances. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 220-39. 
Austin, J. L. 1962: How to Do Things With Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bateman, A. (2012). Pedagogical intersubjectivity: Teaching and learning conversations 
between children and teachers. Wellington, New Zealand: NZCER. 
Bateman, A. (2015) Conversation Analysis and Early Childhood Education: The co-
production of knowledge and relationships. Hampshire: Ashgate/Routledge. 
Bateman, A., Hohepa, M. and Bennett, T. (2017). ‘Indigenising outdoor play with young 
children in New Zealand’ in T. Waller., E. Arlemalm-Hagser., E. B. H. Sandseter., L. 
Lee-Hammond., K. Lekies and S. Wyver (Eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Outdoor Play 
and Learning. Pp 530-543. London: Sage. 
Bentham, J, (2001). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (originally 
published in 1789). In J. Bentham, Selected Writings on Utilitarianism (pp.73-309). 
Ware: Wordsworth Editions. 
Burdelski, M. (2013). “I’m sorry, flower”: Socializing apology, empathy, and relationships in 
Japan. Pragmatics and Society, 4(1), 54-81. 
Burdelski, M. (2017). Pets as Vehicles of Language Socialization: Encouraging Children’s 
Emotional, Moral, and Relational Development in Japanese. In A. Feuerstein & C. Nolte-
Odhiambo (eds.), Childhood and pethood in literature and culture: New perspectives in 
childhood studies and animal studies (pp. 72-86). New York and London: Routledge 
Butler, C. W. (2008) Talk and Social Interaction in the Playground. Hampshire: Ashgate. 
Butler, C. W. and Weatherall, A. (2006). “No We’re Not Playing Families”: Membership 
Categorization in Children’s Play, Research on Language and Social Interaction, 
Volume 39, Issue 4, 441-470. 
Corsaro, W. and Eder, D. (1990). Children’s peer cultures, Annual Review of Sociology, 16, pp 
197-220.  
Darwall, S. (2003) (ed). Contractarianism / Contractualism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Freeman, S. (2007). Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Oxford: Prentice-Hall. 
Gauthier, D. (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Goffman, E. (1971). Relations in public: Micro studies of the public order. New York: Basic 
Books.  
Helmer, O. and Rescher, N. (1958). On the Epistemology of the inexact sciences. Santa Monica, 
California: RAND Corporation. 
 13 
Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan: revised student edition (originally published in 1651) (edited by 
R. Tuck). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kitson, N. (2010). ‘Children’s fantasy role play – why adults should join in’. In J. Myles (ed), 
The Excellence of Play (pp. 108-120). Buckingham: Open University Press.  
Kymlicka, W. (1991). ‘The social contract tradition’. In P. Singer (ed), A Companion to Ethics 
(pp. 186-196). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Locke, J. (1988). Two Treatises on Government 9originally published in 1698) (edited by P. 
Laslett). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mill J.S. (1962). Utilitarianism (originally published in 1861). In M. Warnock (ed), 
Utilitarianism (pp.251-321). Glasgow: Fontana Press. 
Ministry of Education. (1996). Te Whāriki. He Whāriki Mātauranga mō ngā Mokopuna o 
Aotearoa. Early childhood curriculum. Wellington, New Zealand: Learning Media.  
Ochs, E. and Schieffelin, B. B. (2012). “The theory of language socialisation’ in A. Duranti, E. 
Ochs, and B. B. Schieffelin (Eds.) The Handbook of Language Socialization. Pp 1-21. 
Malden, M. A: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Pramling-Samuelsson, I. and Fleer, M. (2009) (Eds.). Play and Learning in Childhood Settings. 
Melbourne: Springer. 
Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice (revised edition, originally published in 1971). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Rousseau J.J. (1968). The Social Contract (originally published in 1762). London: Penguin 
Books. 
Sacks, H. (1992). Lectures on conversation (Vol. I & II). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Sayre-McCord, G. (2000). ‘Contractarianism’. In H. LaFollette (ed), The Blackwell Guide to 
Ethical Theory, (pp. 247-267). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Scanlon, T.M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Schegloff, E. A., (2007). Sequence organization in interaction: Volume 1: A primer in 
conversation analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Sidnell, J. (2011). ‘The epistemics of make-believe’. In T. Stivers, L. Mondada and J. Steensig 
(eds), The morality of knowledge in conversation (pp. 131-158). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Sidnell, J. and Stivers, T. (2012). The Handbook of Conversation Analysis. Malden, M.A: 
Wiley-Blackwell.  
Sutton-Smith, B. (1997). The Ambiguity of play. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Waller. T., Arlemalm-Hagser. E., Sandseter. E. B. H., Lee-Hammond. L., Lekies. K., and 
Wyver. S (Eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Outdoor Play and Learning. Pp 530-543. 
London: Sage. 
Walzer, M. (2004). ‘Involuntary Association’. In M. Walzer, Politics and Passion: Toward a 
More Egalitarian Liberalism (pp.1-20). New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 
 
